Devolution in England:A New Approach by Blick, Andrew
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Blick, A. (2014). Devolution in England: A New Approach. London: Unlock Democracy.
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
1Devolution in England:
A New Approach
Andrew Blick
April 2014
Unlock
Democracy 
2This pamphlet is published by the Federal Trust and Unlock Democracy.
Up-to-date information about the Federal Trust and Unlock Democracy can be 
found on the internet at:
www.fedtrust.co.uk and www.unlockdemocracy.org.uk
The two organisations are publishing this pamphlet as an important contribution 
to topical debate. The pamphlet is not necessarily a statement of view by either of 
these organisations.
© Andrew Blick 2014
ISBN 978-1-903403-95-2
The Federal Trust is a Registered Charity No. 272241
31 Jewry Street
London EC3N 2EY
United Kingdom
Company Limited by Guarantee No.1269848
Design by Fred Fieber
Printed in the European Union
3Devolution in England:
A New Approach
Andrew Blick
4About the author
Dr Andrew Blick is a writer and researcher in the field of democratic 
reform. He is a Lecturer in Politics and Contemporary History at the Centre 
for Political and Constitutional Studies, King’s College London, and was 
formerly a Senior Research Fellow at the Democratic Audit, University of 
Liverpool. Dr Blick has written numerous books, articles and pamphlets, 
including a history of special advisers to ministers, and a history of Prime 
Ministerial aides. He is currently writing a book on the contemporary 
relevance of Magna Carta to tie in with the 800th anniversary of this 
document in 2015. He is a member of Unlock Democracy’s Council and 
a Senior Researcher at the Federal Trust.
5 Contents
 Introduction        6
 Democratic variety: devolution in the UK  6
 The position of England     9
 Future options      13
 Specification for a way forward    17
 The proposal: a description and discussion  20
 Conclusion      24
 Appendix:      24
 The English Devolution Enabling Act: an outline 24
 Devolving powers     24
 Creating new authorities     26
 The legal mechanism     27
 Safeguards and oversight    28
 Primary legislation     28
6Introduction
Variety has always been a feature of the United Kingdom (UK) constitution. 
This quality, thanks to devolution, has become even more pronounced in 
recent years. In many ways the uneven nature of UK democracy is bene-
ficial. It has allowed Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales to develop 
along their own paths towards decentralised self-government. However, 
England is now left behind. The largest nation within the UK does not enjoy 
the benefits of devolution outside Greater London. Signs exist that English 
opinion is now turning against existing arrangements and the discrepancies 
involved. With these trends in mind, this paper makes the case for an En-
glish Devolution Enabling Act. The purpose is to make a contribution to the 
existing debate about how to introduce greater self-governance to England, 
alongside other valuable interventions already made in this area, including 
the ‘Illustrative draft Code for central and local government’, issued by the 
House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee.1
The paper considers the present position and difficulties arising from it; then 
discusses solutions that have been proposed to date, and their problems. It 
proposes a way forward that would allow localities and regions within En-
gland to take on powers previously exercised by central government, help-
ing to close the democratic gap that has opened up with the remainder of 
the UK. The appendix provides a more specific idea of how the proposed 
English Devolution Enabling Act could work.
Democratic variety: devolution in the UK
Long before the term ‘devolution’ came to prominence in the 1990s the 
UK enjoyed an ‘asymmetrical’ system of government. Scotland possessed 
a distinct legal, educational and local-government system, and its own es-
tablished church. Northern Ireland had a devolved Parliament from 1921, 
suspended in 1972. Wales had a Secretary of State from 1964 and the 
Welsh Office became operational the following year. Consequently, while 
the UK was often described before the 1990s as having a ‘unitary’ system, 
it was not as homogeneous as this term might imply.
 
1 See: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/political-and-constitutional-reform/
revisedcodeandnotesforWEBSITE2012amended22Feb.pdf
7The introduction of devolution to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales 
from 1998 continued and magnified an already existing tendency for geo-
graphical variations in constitutional arrangements for the UK. The systems 
established differ in a number of ways. The precise institutions created are 
not the same. Nor are the electoral systems used for the assemblies (or in 
Scotland, the Parliament) and the rules of government formation. The powers 
of the assemblies and ministers differ, as do the ways in which those powers 
are defined and controlled. This complex devolution can be seen largely in 
a positive light. It enables different parts of the UK to be governed in ways 
that accord with their particular political and cultural characteristics. The ar-
rangements in place in Northern Ireland were conceived as part of a peace 
process to reconcile historic divisions in the province, giving antagonistic 
groups a stake in the system and providing them with certain protections.
Associated with the concept of divergence is that of dynamism. Particular 
areas are able to take on different constitutional characteristics at various 
stages. The picture is not static. Before devolution significant changes oc-
curred at various points. The church was disestablished in Ireland (under the 
Irish Church Act 1869) and Wales (under the Welsh Church Act 1914). 
In the devolution era that began in the late 1990s, all the systems intro-
duced have passed through significant alterations, generally involving the 
downward transfer of power from UK level. The Welsh Assembly under the 
Government of Wales Act 2006 has gained new legislative powers in two 
stages. If Scotland, when the referendum on this subject is held in Septem-
ber 2014, chooses to remain within the Union, its Parliament will take on 
important new functions, including some tax-raising, under the Scotland Act 
2012. A possible outcome of the devolutionary momentum may eventually 
be, in some senses, less rather than more divergence between the different 
territories. All of them, spurred by the example of whichever is the most ad-
vanced on the devolutionary path, might converge on maximum autonomy. 
However, in this scenario the discrepancy between these self-governing ter-
ritories and the part of the UK that has not yet developed devolution might 
become even more pronounced.
The variety and flexibility of devolution, building to some extent on al-
ready-existing features of the unwritten UK constitution, have probably con-
tributed to the most notable feature of this experiment in governance: its 
overall success. Devolution has many accomplishments to its credit. First, 
it can be said to have brought important aspects of public decision-taking 
closer to the people directly affected by them. This democratic gain is of 
particular importance in the UK. Notwithstanding the constitutional arrange-
8ments noted above, the UK has had an exceptionally centralised system, 
with a doctrine of a sovereign Parliament – in practice often dominated 
by the executive – held to override all other levels of governance. Devolu-
tion has tended to offset this quality by creating new dispersed centres of 
political authority in parts of the UK, where as a consequence it has been 
possible to take varied approaches to policy in health and education.
Other democratic gains that might be held to have arisen from devolution 
have included the development of different political approaches, includ-
ing electoral systems and institutional practices that promote consensual 
conduct, rather than the adversarial culture characteristic of Westminster. 
Improvements have also been made in gender balance amongst elected 
representatives, if compared with patterns at Westminster. A further ad-
vantage comes because the laws establishing and limiting the devolved 
institutions provide in some ways a beginning of a written constitution for 
the political communities involved. Such legislation creates a degree of 
clarity and legitimacy about the system of government that was previously 
lacking, and continues to be absent in non-devolved parts of the UK. It also 
introduces protections against abuse of authority by the elected legislatures 
that do not apply to the UK Parliament.
A further feature of the success of devolution is that it has become swiftly 
and deeply embedded in UK political practice and culture. The path to-
wards this major constitutional development was long and difficult. In some 
ways as a concept it dates to the nineteenth century, and perhaps even 
earlier. A false start took place in the 1970s, when referendums in Scot-
land and Wales did not deliver the required levels of support to establish 
the envisaged institutions (in Scotland there was a majority in favour, but 
the super-majority requirement was not met). Even in the 1990s devolution 
in these nations did not have universal support from the political parties. 
Opponents included the Conservative Party (though it was committed to 
changes in Northern Ireland as part of the cross-party and international 
peace process). The Labour Party had moved to a more supportive position 
and saw through the implementation of devolution from 1997.
But crucially devolution has proved popular where it has been introduced; 
and people, once given some devolution, have tended to want more. In 
Northern Ireland it has received cross-community support; and has been 
an important component of the achievements in reducing conflict, though it 
has at times been suspended. In Wales devolution had in the past been a 
9divisive idea. In the referendum of 1997 it was approved only by the nar-
rowest of margins (on a turnout of 50.1 per cent, 50.3 voted ‘yes’). But the 
2011 referendum on expanding the legislative scope of the Assembly pro-
duced a ‘yes’ vote of 63.49 per cent (albeit on a turnout of only 35.2 per 
cent). In Scotland, where initial support for devolution was higher, opinion 
research suggests that given a choice between the status quo ante, inde-
pendence, and an expansion of devolution, the third option would be the 
most popular in Scotland, though it will not be on offer to voters in 2014.
There has been a shift towards wider acceptance of devolution across the 
spectrum of political parties. Mechanisms and agreements have appeared 
to ensure relations with the UK centre function smoothly. Devolution is now 
so well embedded in the UK political scene that its position is guaranteed 
for the foreseeable future; and the tendency towards the greater transfer 
of powers is likely to continue. In a strict legal sense it is vulnerable to the 
changing majorities of the UK Parliament. But in reality it is as close to 
being a fixed part of the constitution as is possible in the UK, with each 
particular component underpinned by a referendum (or in Wales, two ref-
erendums). In a sense it represents the UK having taken on some of the 
features of a federal system, in which powers are divided between federal 
and state-level institutions, each with its own protected sphere of operation. 
Devolution is a major change in the way we are governed. That it has 
come with certain problems should be acknowledged. A decline has taken 
place in attachment to the UK or Britain as a collective political community, 
and while producing decentralisation from London, some perceive it as 
leading to a concentration of power within devolved territories themselves. 
But the perceived benefits are great for those who have experienced devo-
lution, and few want to reverse this change.
The position of England
Much of devolution can be seen in a positive light. However, there is an-
other form of differentiation in our constitutional arrangements that is more 
problematic. It arises from the absence of devolution to England outside 
Greater London. The Labour government that initiated devolution initially 
hoped to introduce it to England by stages, establishing first unelected then 
directly elected assemblies to work with Regional Development Agencies 
in each of the English regions. In November 2004 the first of what was 
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intended to be a series of referendums to authorise their introduction took 
place, in the North East region. Voters rejected the proposal, with 77.9 
per cent opposed, on a 49 per cent turnout. The government consequent-
ly abandoned this particular policy for English devolution altogether. The 
enormous changes that have occurred in the political systems and culture of 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales have therefore not occurred in En-
gland. The most significant transformation to have taken place is the estab-
lishment of a Greater London Authority (following a referendum in 1998), 
with a directly-elected Mayor and Assembly. This change amounted to de-
volved government for one of the nine English regions, though some might 
hold it was the reintroduction of the London-wide local government that had 
been abolished in the 1986.
The exclusion of most of England from devolutionary development is partic-
ularly significant when considered in conjunction with the status of English 
local government and the centralised nature of the UK constitution. Though 
responsible for delivering the services that are most vital to people in their 
everyday lives, local government exists in a position of dependency. The 
overriding legal authority of the UK Parliament has, particularly since the 
Second World War, allowed local government progressively to be stripped 
of revenue-raising power and policy autonomy, and the influence of central 
government to increase. Accompanying this diminution of local authority 
has been regular alteration of the structure of local government, again at 
the behest of the centre. Units have changed in size, and whole tiers been 
introduced and removed. The Local Government Act 1972 abolished a 
structure that included 83 County Boroughs and 58 County Councils, re-
placing them with a new organisation comprising six Metropolitan County 
Councils and 47 County Councils. New methods of organisation, moving 
away from the traditional committee system, were imposed. While recent 
UK governments have committed themselves to reversing the erosion of 
local government, they have in practice continued it. A practice of seeking 
to transfer specific powers to vaguely defined ‘communities’ has detracted 
from the position of elected, multi-functional local government. Policies such 
as academy and free schools undermine the role of local authorities in 
the provision of public services. Initiatives supposedly intended to increase 
local flexibility have often been heavily steered from the centre, devised in 
line with its policy objectives. Other efforts to increase local autonomy have 
had negligible impact. Introducing directly-elected mayors was intended 
to encourage greater public interest in local politics, but they have made 
no discernible difference in this regard in the areas that have adopted this 
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innovation. The low turnouts at local elections are perhaps unsurprising giv-
en how little relevance their outcome has. It is hard to find any democratic 
country where there is less territorial dispersal of political power than in the 
UK, with arrangements in England making the greatest contribution to this 
tendency. The consequence of devolution not being introduced to England 
means that over eighty per cent of the UK population has no significant tier 
of government between it and the Westminster/Whitehall core. 
A further problem associated with lack of devolution for England is some-
times grouped under the general heading of the ‘West Lothian Question’. It 
comes about because, since devolution, the UK Parliament has ceased to 
legislate in a substantial range of policy areas for Northern Ireland, Scot-
land and Wales; while it continues to do so for England. Yet all MPs in the 
House of Commons vote on bills, regardless of whether they are returned 
by a constituency inside or outside England, and can take part in debates 
about such issues. Consequently MPs elected from the devolved areas play 
a part in governing England that MPs from English constituencies do not for 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.
It might be held that, if the people in England do not strongly object in large 
numbers to the constitutional imbalances of devolution, then they are not a 
problem. Initially there was no sign of widespread vehement resentment. 
However there is evidence that latterly perceptions in England have begun 
to alter. Research carried out by Cardiff University, the University of Edin-
burgh and the Institute of Public Policy Research has identified significant 
changes. They involve the development of a greater sense of English nation-
al identity. Since the second half of the last decade there has been a shift 
among the English towards regarding themselves as being more ‘English’ 
and away from an emphasis upon being ‘British’. A link exists between 
the extent to which people specifically feel English, and the likelihood and 
extent to which they will regard the consequences of devolution for the UK 
as unbeneficial. The position of Scotland is a particular subject of resent-
ment. A widespread complaint in England involves the idea that Scotland 
is somehow gaining greater financial and economic benefits than it mer-
its, as compared with England. Overall in 2011, 35 per cent of English 
respondents felt that the Scottish Parliament had had a negative impact 
upon the governance of Great Britain, 20 per cent that it had not made a 
difference, and 18 per cent that it had led to an improvement. In 2007, 
the respective figures were more favourable towards devolution: 14, 55 
and 12. In Wales, the same options for 2011 (with the 2007 figures in 
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brackets) were negative: 31 per cent (11), no impact: 24 per cent (58), 
positive: 17 per cent (11).2
Not only England as a whole is regarded as suffering relatively unfair 
treatment. A large majority of English people polled believe that some parts 
of England are better supported by the policies of the UK government than 
others. London and the South East are often regarded as the most fortunate 
regions. Even a majority of Londoners believe that the area they live in 
is better treated by the UK government than other parts of England. This 
notion of internal variation within England could suggest that any attempt 
to address problems in the position of England should not only take into 
account England as a single unit but consider smaller sub-entities. None-
theless, a clear sense seems to exist that England is collectively losing out. 
In 2012 62 per cent of those surveyed in England felt the UK government 
could not be relied upon to work for the benefit of England as a whole.3
At the same point only 21 per cent of English respondents felt the existing 
constitutional arrangements for England, with the full UK Parliament legislat-
ing for England, should be retained. When asked to rank priorities for con-
stitutional change, English people placed the arrangements for governing 
England in the post-devolution era second only to UK relations with the EU, 
ahead of issues such as the electoral system and the House of Lords.4 Yet 
though there is plain evidence of dissatisfaction, the idea of some distinc-
tive democratic institutional representation has been slow to make its way 
onto the agenda of the mainstream parties. Though there are now clear 
signs of change in this regard, firm proposals have yet to appear. While 
this ‘English issue’ does not seem to be a significant influence on the way 
in which people in England cast their votes, given the existence of negative 
feeling over the impact of devolution, it should not be assumed the matter 
will remain off the central political agenda permanently. Moreover, it is 
preferable to attempt to deal with the problems raised by an un-devolved 
England before they become a controversy with potentially divisive conse-
quences for England and the UK as a whole.
2 See: R. Wyn Jones, G. Lodge, A. Henderson and D. Wincott, The dog that finally barked: England as 
an emerging political community (ippr: London, 2012), p.9.
3 R. Wyn Jones, G. Lodge, C. Jeffery, G. Gottfried, R. Scully, A. Henderson and D. Wincott, England 
and its two unions: the anatomy of a nation and its discontents (ippr: London, 2013), p.11. 
4 Ibid. pp.35-6. devolution
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Future options
If it is accepted that action is required about England, what are the options 
on offer? The Labour government elected in 1997 originally envisaged 
the introduction by stages of directly-elected assemblies at regional level 
in England. This goal was achieved with Greater London, but nowhere 
else. There are a number of arguments in favour of this model. On the one 
hand, it would entail governing in units of a size large enough that few 
would dispute their potential to take on meaningful strategic policy roles in 
land-use planning, transport and major infrastructure projects. On the other 
hand, these units are small enough compared with the UK as a whole to 
mean that genuine devolution would have taken place, from the larger, 
more remote central government to a smaller one, closer to those it served. 
Moreover, there is reasonable similarity of scale between these units. While 
disparities of population size exist, none of these regions is large enough 
to dwarf its equivalents in England, or Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales (though there has been some discussion about whether the South 
East region would need to be split). If a desire existed to move towards a 
more federal UK, it is possible to conceive such a system composed of de-
volved entities within this size-range as being practically viable. Moreover, 
the regions already had some practical grounding, forming administrative 
units for Whitehall (with a Government Office and Regional Development 
Agency in each) and European Union purposes. They are also used as 
constituencies for the European parliamentary elections.
However, there were various flaws with the Labour plan and its execution. 
Though they had a bureaucratic existence, the regions suffered from a 
lack of cultural or political resonance, and popular attachment. There was 
no meaningful comparison to the national consciousness of, for instance, 
Wales. In some cases sub-national identities do exist in England, for in-
stance in Cornwall, but often they do not necessarily match the boundaries 
of the regions. The North East was believed to be the region most likely to 
vote ‘yes’ to an elected Assembly, but it did not come close to an affirma-
tive verdict. Another difficulty was that the Labour government did not treat 
the extension of devolution to the English regions as a high priority. The 
‘yes’ campaign in the North East was criticised as poorly run. Moreover, 
the type of assembly on offer at the time of the North East referendum 
possessed negligible powers, some of which were intended to be drawn 
upwards from local authorities, some of which would be abolished. From 
this perspective its introduction would have been a centralising measure. It 
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might be argued that, once established, a dynamic similar to that in other 
devolved areas, towards greater autonomy from the centre, would have 
taken hold. Moreover a top-down approach to devolution, using boundar-
ies devised at the centre, is not necessarily wrong, and can promote sub-
sequent changes of outlook and the emergence of new popular identities. 
However, in terms of practical politics, the crucial initial test was failed.
After the North East referendum, in November 2004 the Labour govern-
ment abandoned the idea of moving straight to directly-elected region-
al assemblies. It continued experimenting with assemblies that were not 
directly elected, and later appointed regional ministers at UK level who 
answered to regional select committees in the House of Commons. But 
another version of English regionalism was appearing. The city-regional 
model became increasingly fashionable within government. This concept 
involves the idea of large conurbations as drivers of economic growth, with 
a reach that expands far beyond their formal political boundaries. While 
city-regions would as devolved units potentially be more in accordance 
with existing cultural tendencies, they present various problems. Defining 
their boundaries might be problematic, particularly in areas where they 
overlap with each other. It might also be difficult to achieve complete cov-
erage of England, with some areas not clearly falling into any city region. 
Attempts to resolve such demarcation difficulties could produce unpalat-
able propositions. For instance, the idea of locating Cornwall within, for 
instance, a devolved Plymouth city region will always face objections from 
within Cornwall.
The coalition government formed in 2010 took steps to dismantle much 
of the administrative paraphernalia of the nine English regions, but took 
an interest in the cities as a possible platform for decentralisation. In May 
2012 it held referendums in eleven English cities on whether to introduce 
directly-elected mayors. The proposal did not in itself amount to a signifi-
cant downward transfer of power, but could perhaps have formed a basis 
for greater development in this direction in future. As in the North East, 
the electorate proved unenthusiastic. In only one case, Bristol, did a city 
assent to this new directly-elected office. The city councils of Leicester and 
Liverpool had already opted to introduce a directly-elected mayor without 
a referendum. Another coalition policy involves the establishment of a new 
elected regional tier of government, operating in a limited field, through 
the introduction of directly-elected Police and Crime Commissioners. Voters 
were not invited to approve this policy through a referendum, and turnout in 
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the elections in 2012 was low, at an overall level of around 15 per cent. 
Apart from proposals for executive mayors and police commissioners, there 
has been little progress under the coalition with regard to greater demo-
cratic input to public policy at regional level; and none is on the immediate 
agenda.
Of the possible means of rectifying the problematic position of England 
post-devolution, regional devolution in its various forms is the only one to 
have been attempted. Other ideas are available. One is the introduction of 
an English Parliament. Campaign groups exist to promote this goal. Some 
mainstream politicians have shown an interest in the idea, but a major par-
liamentary party has not yet adopted it. In its favour an English Parliament 
would be a meaningful national equivalent to similar bodies in Scotland 
and Wales, perhaps operating within a UK of an increasingly federal na-
ture. It would attach itself to a concept with more resonance than the nine 
English regions. Indeed, English identity is, as already noted, strengthen-
ing, and increasingly taking on a political dimension. An English Parliament 
could provide a positive outlet for an English national consciousness that 
currently often defines itself – politically speaking – in negative terms.
However, an English Parliament would not address the issue of over-cen-
tralisation in a meaningful way, since it would involve handling policy for 
a population level not much less than that of the full UK – about 53 million 
instead of 63 million. Furthermore, it would potentially produce difficulties. 
An English Parliament would account for more than 80 per cent of the UK 
population, and perhaps an even larger proportion of its economic activity. 
It could comprise a destabilising force within the UK. It might well pose 
a challenge to the status of the UK Parliament; and an English executive, 
however the powers were formally divided, could be a clear rival to a UK 
government. The history of federal experiments in other parts of the world 
suggests that when one component of the federation is so much greater 
than any other, the arrangement is difficult to sustain. The desire of England 
to achieve an influence equivalent to its population and wealth might be 
difficult to reconcile with the perceived need among the other parts of the 
UK for guarantees and protections.
Another approach, supported by the Conservative Party, is specifically fo-
cused on the West Lothian question. Sometimes known as ‘English votes 
for English laws’ (EVEL), it seeks to correct the perceived unfairness of MPs 
who were not returned by English constituencies involving themselves in 
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English business in Parliament. In January 2012 the Coalition government 
established the Commission on the Consequences of Devolution for the 
House of Commons (or ‘McKay Commission’), charged with investigating 
means by which the Commons could handle laws that did not apply to 
the whole of the UK. The Commission reported in March 2013. It found 
discontent in England over the West Lothian question. The report then ruled 
out a series of options as a means of achieving progress in the area with 
which it was concerned: abolishing devolution, preserving existing ar-
rangements, enhancing the powers of English local government (though it 
was not opposed to this change in principle), introducing a federal system, 
and electoral reform. It proposed instead the introduction of a tenet that 
the agreement of a majority of MPs from English (or in some circumstances 
English and Welsh) constituencies should be required for decisions with 
specific consequences for England (or England and Wales).
It is difficult to justify an arrangement whereby, potentially, Parliament could 
pass a law directly impacting only on England that did not receive the 
assent of a majority of elected representatives from English constituencies 
in the Commons. Moreover, if it could be realised, EVEL could be the 
most straightforward change of those discussed above, not involving the 
creation of a new institution or tier of government. It seems to be the most 
popular approach among English voters, at least of those currently under 
discussion. The research project cited above on English attitudes found in 
2012 that 36 per cent supported what is in effect EVEL – though the con-
ductors of this project stressed it was only a plurality, not a decisive view. 
This figure compares with 21 per cent favouring existing arrangements for 
making laws for England; 20 per cent agreeing with an English Parliament; 
and 8 per cent inclined towards elected regional assemblies in England. 
16 per cent said they did not know.5
But sceptics have drawn attention to possible difficulties with EVEL. There 
may be complexities involved in identifying specifically ‘English’ or ‘En-
glish and Welsh’ laws, and it could well involve breaking down bills into 
individual clauses with different territorial impact (though others claim the 
challenge is surmountable). Some hold that EVEL would have a negative 
impact on the solidarity of the UK, fracturing the unity of the UK Parliament 
through establishing different classes of MP within it. MPs, it could be held, 
are not solely representatives of the geographical area that returns them, 
but deliberate collectively on behalf of the whole UK. Legislation, though it 
may technically be English, can have wider consequences across internal 
UK borders. It also normally has financial implications, with consequences 
5 Ibid. p.13.
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for the allocation of funding throughout the UK. Another criticism of the EVEL 
idea involves a scenario in which a party that had a majority of MPs in the 
Commons did not have an ‘English’ majority. In such circumstances, two 
different governments would be possible according to the particular poli-
cy involved: a difficult proposition. Moreover, like the English Parliament 
proposal, EVEL does not address the issue of over-centralisation of political 
power applying to England, since English policy-making and legislation 
would take place at the same level as presently, but with a slightly smaller 
number of MPs involved.
Of the three broad models discussed above: regional devolution, an English 
Parliament, and English votes for English laws, each has shortcomings. More-
over, English opinion has not yet decisively come to favour any one option. 
Yet there is evidence that support for prevailing arrangements is dropping. 
It is therefore important to consider whether there are other approaches that 
could help resolve some of the problems identified in this paper.
Specification for a way forward
This paper makes the case for an approach to English devolution that:
•	 Brings the exercise of political power closer to people in England, 
through enabling the transfer of significant functions presently ex-
ercised at UK level to directly-elected and democratically account-
able authorities in England (referred to here as ‘devolution’), which 
could be existing local government institutions rather than to spe-
cially created devolved entities;
•	 Employs administrative units that are significantly smaller than the 
UK – in other words, does not simply involve the operation of 
powers at the level of England as a whole;
•	 Is based on genuine demand from below for particular powers 
to be transferred to specific geographical localities, instigating a 
‘bottom-up’ approach as the alternative to the ‘top-down’ method 
previously pursued to devolution within England;
•	 Provides genuine flexibility to those on whom power was de-
volved, rather than requiring them to contribute towards the policy 
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imperatives of the UK government;
•	 Makes it possible for governments in the localities of England to 
choose to combine. It should allow for the creation of democratic 
regional government; and even an all-England Parliament, if suffi-
cient desire exists;
•	 Allows for change and development in the system, while estab-
lishing protection from unilateral interference or reversal from the 
centre;
•	 Permits areas that do not initially exercise their option to call down 
powers to do so at a later stage. Institutions that take on authorities 
could also add to them at a later stage. The geographical bound-
aries of these units need not be permanently fixed.
In meeting these specifications, the system proposed here is not intended 
primarily to provide for a political-institutional expression for English nation-
al consciousness through an English Parliament. At the same time, it would 
not preclude attempts to address this issue by those who felt such action 
was necessary, and could conceivably be used for this purpose. It does 
not specifically seek to answer the ‘West Lothian’ question of the voting 
rights of MPs in the House of Commons. The McKay commission found 
that enhanced local government would deal with issues internal to England 
rather than the overall position of England, and therefore would not help 
with ‘West Lothian’. Yet the proposal here could to some extent reduce the 
salience of ‘West Lothian’ by increasing the extent to which English matters 
were handled democratically at a sub-UK level. Nor is the broad approach 
advocated here conceived of necessarily as a means of achieving blanket 
devolution throughout the UK, though potentially it could lead to this out-
come. It is not, furthermore, concerned with how territorial units in England 
might link together at a UK level into some kind of federal superstructure. 
Once again, however, the pursuance of the present proposal is not inimical 
to a federal objective, and could aid progress towards it in the longer run, 
if demand existed.
The objective that this scheme seeks expressly to bring about is that of clos-
ing the democratic gap between England and other parts of the UK that 
has opened up since the instigation of devolution. It is designed to enable 
those areas that want to, to achieve greater self-governance in a fashion 
that suits them. The idea of bringing devolution to England is not new, and 
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was part of the overall plan of the Labour government first elected in 1997. 
Plans to expand the remit of local government have also been put forward 
by successive governments, though they have never been able to override 
the grip of ministers and civil servants intent on preserving departmental 
dominance. However, the difference between this proposal and earlier 
efforts is that the former is designed to be driven from below, rather than 
above. The overall framework would have to be set at the level of the UK 
Parliament, in the form of primary legislation. But it would be designed in 
such a way as to enable the localities to take the initiative over the sub-
stance of the powers they were to assume, and the way in which they were 
to exercise them. It could have the effect of making sub-UK democracy in 
England more meaningful, with voters making genuine decisions about 
policy at election time.
A model that might usefully be adapted in seeking to fulfil the ends ad-
dressed above is that employed within the Spanish constitution of 1978. 
Under this system different ‘Autonomous Communities’ of Spain can adopt 
varying degrees of self-government, according to their specific characteris-
tics. Initially it was intended to allow particular areas to define themselves 
as wishing to exercise self-government, setting (within reason) their own 
geographical boundaries, and not necessarily to devise a set of regions 
covering the whole of Spain. However, the agenda soon developed and 
a total of seventeen regions emerged, with no physical gaps. The precise 
powers possessed by each Community vary, in accordance with the partic-
ular preferences of each one. At the outset the 1978 constitution allowed 
for a twin-track approach: fuller autonomy, requiring approval by two ref-
erendums in the Community, or a more basic level of self-government that 
would be expanded later. Within this system there was acknowledgement 
of those parts of Spain that possessed their own distinctive national con-
sciousness (though the possibility that they might be ‘nations’ rather than 
‘nationalities’, the official term used, was a subject of controversy). The 
Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia were permitted to assume the 
enhanced form of autonomy without needing to fulfil the referendum require-
ments. Andalucía joined them at the forefront of the movement to self-rule, 
but had to secure the full consent of its population through referendums. The 
remainder of the Autonomous Regions opted for the lesser set of powers. 
Subsequently the roles of these latter Communities have expanded, closing 
the gap somewhat, though some of the more advanced Communities have 
in response moved further forward still. In other words, there has been a 
competitive shift towards autonomy, or devolution.
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In Spain the status of the Autonomous Community is set out in a Statute of 
Autonomy tailored to each territory. Though the initiative for the form it will 
take comes from the relevant Community, the Spanish Parliament (‘Cortes 
Generales’) approves the Statute – being unable to repeal it without the 
agreement of the Community. Communities can, with approval from the 
centre and within specified limits, determine both the powers they will pos-
sess and their internal governmental arrangements. There is often a signifi-
cant overlap of responsibility between Community and central authorities. 
They coordinate with each other constantly. Spain has established a system 
that has entailed it moving towards an increasingly federal status, while 
not fully adopting a system of this sort – it does not, for instance, incorpo-
rate the Communities into a central body equivalent to the United States 
Senate. Spain shares certain qualities with the UK. It has diverse cultural 
characteristics within it, contributing to internal asymmetry. But unlike the 
UK it has managed to provide not only for areas with a strong ‘nationality’ 
or national identity to become more self-governing, but for other regions of 
less definite consciousness to take on more power at their own pace. In this 
sense, while the process has produced some complications and tensions, 
the UK may have something valuable to learn from Spain.
The proposal: a description and discussion
The specific scheme advanced here would allow existing local authority 
units, or combinations of such units, to call down powers from a central 
menu. Initially, the powers on offer would be of an executive nature, rather 
than involving the ability to issue the equivalent of primary legislation or 
raise taxes. In this sense, it is deliberately modest. However, it is envisaged 
that the scope could and should be expanded in time, in particular to 
provide greater financial autonomy. This proposal does not underrate the 
importance of self-financing self-government, rather it wishes properly to 
prepare the ground for it in England. The developments in this regard in the 
devolved territories of the UK, that are themselves in their very early stages, 
will probably provide valuable lessons.
Specific procedures would need to be followed to bring about the devolu-
tion of powers and the establishment of new combinations of local authori-
ties. Often, the local authority itself would decide; while in some cases the 
local populations would play a direct role through referendums, and local 
constitutional conventions would be formed to deliberate. The decision over 
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whether and what to devolve would be left at local level. Once transferred 
downwards, protections would apply against powers being encroached 
upon or removed by the central government. It would be possible to oper-
ate within the existing local-government framework, or at a regional or even 
all-England level. Certain safeguards would remain in place. The dismem-
berment of existing local authorities would be prohibited. All powers, at 
whatever level they were exercised, would remain subject to public finan-
cial auditing procedures, freedom of information requests, judicial review 
and human-rights standards.
Some might hold that this mechanism would lead to an overly intricate set 
of constitutional arrangements permanently fluctuating and detrimental to 
the effective conduct of public policy. Yet, as we have seen, differentiation 
in governmental arrangements has always been a core characteristic of 
the UK. It has become more pronounced since the late 1990s, and is 
continuing to grow. At present the position of England is a pronounced part 
of this divergence. In some ways, enabling the devolution of power within 
England would be to reduce the level of discrepancy, bringing this nation 
into line with the other parts of the UK where devolution already exists. 
Though it might create complexities in other senses, such an outcome is not 
necessarily an argument against this change. Indeed constitutional diversity 
might be seen as a quality worth encouraging if it is of the sort that enables 
different areas to govern themselves in ways appropriate to their particular 
characteristics. But what of the possible objection to this proposal that it 
would stimulate ongoing governmental upheaval? This condition already 
prevails. For decades, central government and the UK Parliament have 
constantly altered the form and content of local government. Boundaries 
have shifted, types of local authority have come and gone, and responsibil-
ities have changed hands. This proposal, if successful, will lead to another 
process of change, that might grow over time (and presumably eventually 
subside). What would distinguish this development would be that the de-
cisions would be made not at UK level, but by those who would have to 
bear their consequences; and it could lead to more dispersal of authority, 
rather than the forced march towards the centre that has previously taken 
place in England.
Some will query whether, with only a modest set of powers initially on offer, 
much can be made of them. The capacity for local ingenuity should not 
be underestimated. At the outset of Celtic devolution similar doubts were 
cast about whether devolved institutions would amount to more than talking 
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shops. They proved misconceived. Moreover, in time extra powers – in-
cluding some responsibility for finance – should be included amongst the 
range of responsibilities made available. Others might question whether the 
desire exists at local level for taking on more autonomy. Perhaps it does not. 
In which case, making powers available is at worst a harmless exercise, 
wasting no more parliamentary time and public resources than any other 
piece of legislation with minimal impact. However, it is likely that some lo-
calities will be attracted by the powers available, possibly deploying them 
and working in conjunction with each other. If they are seen to make a 
success of the experiment, then others will follow as momentum gathers. In 
time pressure could build to expand the range of responsibilities available 
for devolution. As elsewhere in the UK the supply of devolution could create 
its own demand.
A further likely objection to variable devolution is that it would prove im-
practical. Opponents might argue that transferring individual functions from 
UK to local level presents organisational challenges that would be difficult 
to overcome. Some issues will need to be resolved, such as the role and al-
location of civil servants currently attached to Whitehall. But if this scheme is 
introduced, it is assumed it will be accompanied by a strong political desire 
to make it viable, that will find its way into the dealings between the aspi-
rant devolved English institutions and the centre. Devolution arrangements 
elsewhere in the UK have, with cooperation and goodwill on both sides, 
functioned relatively smoothly. As in these earlier cases, the core legislation 
would need to be supplemented by concordats, institutional arrangements, 
and an intention on the part of all involved to make a success of the rela-
tionship. The outlook and habits of ministers and officials would need to 
adjust to take into account the change in their overall remit. So too would 
those of MPs representing constituencies in England, as have those of MPs 
from Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland in the post-devolution era. 
It might be held that this variable devolution proposal creates the danger 
that powers will be transferred to an authority with a population too small 
properly to exercise them. It may be that certain safeguards could be built 
into the legislation in this regard. However, it is also important to be aware 
of comparisons within the UK and internationally. Each of the old English 
regions was larger than Northern Ireland, so devolution on this scale need 
not present problems. Moreover, in Switzerland, the extent of the powers 
possessed by the 26 Cantons exceeds that envisaged for devolution under 
the plan presented here for England. Yet the population of some Cantons 
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numbers only in the tens of thousands, broadly similar to that of the smallest 
unitary authority in England, Rutland County Council. The largest Canton, 
Zurich, has a population of approximately 1.4 million: a similar figure to 
that served by Kent County Council. While conditions applying in Swit-
zerland and England are not identical, on this evidence fears of excessive 
devolution in England should not be overstated.
Some critics may present scenarios in which local authorities take on func-
tions for which they are unprepared, or which they deploy irresponsibility, 
leading either to poor performance or even disaster, possibly requiring 
intervention by central government at considerable cost to UK taxpayers as 
a whole. But variety in local services provided, and inevitably the quality, 
is part of the essence of this proposal. Each area is entitled to find its own 
way and make its own mistakes – and there will not, in any case, be uni-
versal agreement about what is and is not an error. Some apocalyptic pre-
dictions contain an anti-democratic strand since they imply people cannot 
be entrusted with the running of their own affairs. The English population 
would not be offered anything more – and initially less – than is available 
to their counterparts in other parts of the UK. Problems may emerge. In the 
first instance, they would be a matter between governmental institutions 
and the voters to whom they were accountable in their areas. Constructing 
extreme sets of circumstances of failure does not necessarily create a defin-
itive argument against proceeding with a potentially valuable democratic 
reform. The UK government has proved willing to entrust responsibility for 
public services, such as the creation and management of schools, to the 
hands of individuals and groups who are subject to no local democratic 
accountability. Compared with this practice, variable devolution seems a 
lower-risk option. Furthermore, the track record of central government in 
deploying its powers responsibly and effectively is far from perfect. Indeed, 
some would hold that if Whitehall and Westminster were not as overload-
ed with functions that should be handled at a lower level, it might perform 
more effectively itself in future in its national strategic role. Finally, in many 
cases local authorities might simply be recovering powers they possessed 
previously, and possibly recreating tiers of governance that have existed in 
similar forms in the past. Regardless of the precise merits of such decisions, 
there is no reason to suppose they will lead to cataclysm when they did 
not before.
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Conclusion
The lack of devolution in England needs to be taken seriously. It is a prob-
lem that will not go away by itself, and becomes worse as time passes. The 
English public are starting to take notice. Successive UK governments have 
showed some awareness that all is not well. They have attempted limited 
remedies. But they have not pursued them properly and have used flawed 
models. Other options yet to be tried present difficulties of their own. Con-
sequently there is nothing to be lost and much to be gained by considering 
a new approach. A system of devolution that allows devolution to be driven 
not by the UK government but from the areas to which devolution will take 
place has much to commend it. It places the initiative for self-government 
where it should be; and offers the possibility of generating momentum for 
further decentralisation in future.
 
Appendix
The English Devolution Enabling Act: an outline
Following on from the preceding analysis of the existing problem of exces-
sive centralisation of political authority in England and the broad principles 
of a plan to reduce this problem, this appendix gives an example of how 
an English Devolution Enabling Act (‘the Act’) could work in practice.
The general principle underpinning the Act would be that a clear set of 
powers should be made available for transfer from central government to 
English local authorities; or other larger units that these bodies might form. 
Furthermore, decisions about transfers of those powers should be made 
in the localities themselves; and there should be a degree of protection in 
place against them being removed at the initiative of the centre. Finally, 
the geographical boundaries and size of local authorities should be deter-
mined within the localities and not at the centre; and it should be possible 
to create new directly-elected bodies such as regional authorities or even 
an all-England body.
Devolving powers
The provision for devolved powers proposed for the Act is modelled in 
some respects on the Government of Wales Act 1998 (superseded by the 
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Government of Wales Act 2006). Following this model, executive powers 
would be devolved to a particular English local authority, either pre-existing 
or nascent, or a new larger body. Powers previously vested in UK govern-
ment ministers would be transferred to the local authority.
The powers that could be devolved would be included within a list of fields, 
attached as a schedule to the Act:
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries and food;
Ancient monuments and historic buildings;
Culture (including museums, galleries and libraries);
Economic development;
Education and training;
The environment;
Health and health services;
Highways;
Housing;
Industry;
Local government (though not including the exercise of powers allotted to 
the Secretary of State by the Act itself);
Social services;
Sport and recreation;
Tourism;
Town and country planning;
Transport;
Water and flood defence; and
Promotion of languages.
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A notable absence from this list is finance. However, there is every reason 
to believe that, with the system established as a success, it could and 
should be added to the list: indeed this outcome would be a key goal 
of the whole project. Local authorities may demand its inclusion in some 
form. If during discussions leading to the introduction of this Act, there were 
strong demands for finance to be included from the outset, then it could be 
included.
It would be possible for a single field, or a group of them, or particular 
powers within one or more to be transferred to a local authority. The transfer 
of responsibility to an authority could be carried out on the initiative of an 
authority, with a simple majority of members required. If it chose, the author-
ity could at a later date return the power to the centre, though a minimum 
time period would then apply before the area could acquire it again.
Creating new authorities 
The Act would enable two or more local authorities above town and parish 
level to combine in new ways. Both the size of the new authority – which 
could cover a county or region – and the powers transferred to it would 
be determined in the area. The process would be initiated either by simple 
majority votes by the members of each of the local authorities or by petitions 
of 10 per cent of the electorate of each of the local authorities.
A local constitutional convention would then be convened along lines set 
out in a schedule to the Act. This convention would comprise elected local 
representatives, and could also include members of the public selected at 
random from the electoral registers of the local authorities. It would consider 
the constitution of the new proposed authority and the particular powers 
which would be transferred to it (within the terms of the Act), in addition 
to existing statutory local-authority powers that it may possess. Matters to 
be considered would include whether a single new authority would be 
created, or if an elected authority might co-exist with elected sub-authorities, 
either pre-existing or newly established. Safeguards would protect against 
the problematic secession of areas from within existing local authorities, 
such as the possibility for ministerial intervention, subject to clear guidelines 
and possible challenge in the courts.
The convention would produce a proposal within six months that would be 
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subject to a referendum in all of the local authority areas covered by it. A 
simple majority across the entire area covered by the intended new author-
ity would mean the proposal was approved and would be implemented; 
except where it was proposed that one or more pre-existing local authori-
ties within the overall area be abolished or have powers transferred away 
from them to the new authority. In cases of this kind a simple majority would 
be required in any area with an authority which it was proposed would be 
abolished or have powers transferred away from it.
The Act would create a specific procedure allowing for the creation of a 
directly-elected all-England authority. A petition signed by five per cent of 
individuals on English electoral registers would trigger the establishment of 
a constitutional convention, again in accordance with details set out in a 
schedule to the Act. The convention would produce a proposal within 12 
months. Matters with which it would deal would include the constitution 
and powers of the English authority and its relationship with English local 
government (and other tiers of government that may have been established 
by this time such as regional government). Safeguards for the status and 
powers of English local authorities would be included in the Act. The pro-
posal would then be subject to approval through an English referendum, 
requiring a simple majority across the whole of England.
The legal mechanism
Once the procedures for the reconstitution of and/or devolution of powers 
to authorities had been met, the Act would require the Secretary of State to 
issue an order, not subject to parliamentary approval, giving effect to the 
change. The details of the authority concerned and the powers transferred 
to it would be added to a schedule to the Act.
The Secretary of State would be authorised exceptionally to decline to issue 
an order giving effect to such changes, or to modify the proposed changes, 
on a basis of clearly defined UK policy issues, set out in a schedule to the 
Act. In using this power the Secretary of State would be required to issue a 
statement explaining the reasoning for the decision, and would be subject 
to possible judicial review. Such an order would require affirmative approv-
al from both Houses of Parliament.
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Safeguards and oversight
Any devolved powers would be subject to political accountability in the 
same way as any other actions within the authority, according to the par-
ticular structure it adopted.
All the activities of a local authority, as at present, would be subject to 
judicial review. If a particular action fell outside the powers that the local 
authority possessed or contravened the European Convention on Human 
Rights or European law, it could be quashed by a UK or European court, 
with the possibility that the local authority could be ordered to provide some 
form of remedy.
The Secretary of State would possess under the Act a power exceptionally 
to prevent or compel certain actions by an authority within the scope of 
powers that had been devolved to it under the terms of the Act. This power 
could be exercised only on a basis of UK policy concerns set out precisely 
in a schedule to the Act. When exercising the power the Secretary of State 
would be required to give detailed reasons and would be subject to pos-
sible judicial review.
Though perhaps beyond the terms of the Act, it is advisable that a joint 
committee of the two Houses of the ouses of the UK Parliament be estab-
lished to consider the operation of the system established under the Act 
including the role of the Secretary of State. It would take written and oral 
evidence and produce reports, possibly including recommendations de-
signed to ensure the Act achieved its objectives more effectively, or that the 
scope of the system be expanded.
Primary legislation
Primary law-making powers would not be devolved and would continue to 
be exercised by the UK Parliament. The Act would specify a form of con-
sultation through the Local Government Association that would be required 
before the UK government introduced a bill to Parliament intended to bring 
about statutory alteration to any powers falling within the list of fields which 
it was possible to devolve.
If the UK government sought to alter the Act itself through primary legisla-
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tion, a bill introduced to Parliament would be required to state expressly 
that it was intended to amend the Act. Consequently any attempt to alter 
arrangements for variable devolution would be subject to fuller public scru-
tiny than if they were brought about by legislation that amended the Act 
less explicitly. Through including provision to protect sections in the Act from 
‘implied repeal’, the Act would also be protected against legislation which 
might otherwise alter it inadvertently rather than intentionally. The Act would 
thereby become partially entrenched as a new part of the UK constitutional 
settlement, finally providing England with a chance to reap the benefits of 
devolution, that have been available to its fellow members of the union for 
well over a decade.
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Variety has always been a feature of the United Kingdom 
constitution. This variety has allowed Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales to develop along their own paths to-
wards decentralised self-government. However, England, 
the largest nation within the UK, has been left behind. Signs 
exist that English opinion is now turning against existing 
arrangements and the discrepancies involved. With these 
trends in mind, this paper makes the case for an English 
Devolution Enabling Act. It proposes a way forward that 
would allow localities and regions within England to take 
on powers previously exercised by central government, 
helping to close the democratic gap that has opened up 
with the remainder of the UK. The appendix provides a 
more specific idea of how the proposed English Devolution 
Enabling Act could work.
